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TORT LAW-The Supreme Court Provides a Remedy for
Injured Plaintiffs Under the Theory of Loss of
Chance-Alberts v. Schultz
I. INTRODUCTION
In Alberts v. Schultz,' the New Mexico Supreme Court confirmed the decision
of the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Baer v. Regents of the University of
California2 to adopt the loss of chance doctrine as a theory of tort recovery in New
Mexico. Under this doctrine, a person with a preexisting medical condition whose
chance of recovery was reduced because of medical negligence may recover for that
reduced chance, even if the odds of recovery would have been less than fifty percent
with the correct medical treatment.3 Interestingly, the doctrine imposes no
additional duties on defendants. Alberts establishes that the loss of chance claim is
evaluated using duty, breach, causation and damages; the same elements used in
other claims of negligence.
While the supreme court's recognition and adoption of the loss of chance
doctrine may promote equality in the treatment of plaintiffs injured by the
negligence of others, the doctrine's strict proof of causation requirements render it
useless for some legitimately injured plaintiffs. Moreover, the method of calculating
damages under the doctrine is unclear and leaves several unanswered questions.
This Note reviews the establishment of the loss of chance doctrine in New Mexico,
analyzes the court's opinion, and explores the potential implications of the doctrine.
H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Dee Alberts, who had a history of peripheral vascular disease, saw his
primary care physician, Dr. Russell C. Schultz, on July 14, 1992, complaining of
severe pain in his right foot in the absence of activity or exercise.4 This "rest pain"
is a recognized symptom of impending gangrene, which can lead to the amputation
of the affected limb.5 At that visit, Dr. Schultz observed that Mr. Alberts' foot was
dusky in color. Nonetheless, he did not order or perform any further tests, even
though an arteriogram6 and motor sensory exams may have given him more
information about the severity of Mr. Alberts' problem.

1. 126 N.M. 807,975 P.2d 1279(1999).
2. 126 N.M. 508,972 P.2d9 (Ct. App. 1998).
3. See id.; see also PROPOSED N.M. UJ.I CIV. 13-1635 (1999).
A party is liable for negligence resulting in another's lost chance for [a better outcome to]
(survival from] a preexisting condition. This lost opportunity is an injury in itself. For__
-'s
to recover on this claim a medical expert must have established that, as a result of
lost a measurable opportunity to avoid [loss of limb], [loss or life],
negligence,

I_

(other)].

Id.
4. See Alberts, 126 N.M. at 808, 975 P.2d at 1280 (defining peripheral vascular disease as "a chronic
progressive narrowing of the blood vessels which restricts the flow of blood to a particular area of the body."). All
facts and proceedings are taken fromAlberts, 126 N.M. at 808-09,975 P.2d at 1280-81, unless otherwise specified.

5. See id.
6. An arteriogram is the x-ray visualization of an artery after injection of a dye that will be visible on the
x-ray. See WEBsmT's 3RD INTERNAI1ONAL DIcToNARY (unabridged 1976). The Alberts court defined it simply
as "a diagnostic test that assists in evaluating the condition of blood vessels." Alberts, 126 N.M. at 808, 975 P.2d
at 1280.
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Mr. Alberts requested a referral to Dr. Gopal Reddy, a vascular surgeon who had
seen him previously for this condition. Dr. Schultz approved the referral, knowing
that Dr. Reddy was on vacation and would not be immediately available.7 On July
27, 1992, thirteen days later, Dr. Reddy saw Mr. Alberts and examined his foot. Mr.
Alberts was immediately sent to the hospital for further testing. An arteriogram and
angioplasty were performed that day. Those procedures were unsuccessful and
bypass surgery was conducted the following day. Despite the efforts of Dr. Reddy,
by August 1, 1992 Mr. Alberts' leg showed no improvement and was amputated
below the knee.
The Alberts8 brought suit against both doctors for medical malpractice, alleging
that their negligence resulted in amputation of Mr. Alberts' leg. Specifically, the
Alberts asserted that Dr. Schultz failed to inform Mr. Alberts of the severity of the
condition in his foot; that Dr. Schultz was negligent because he did not perform
appropriate examinations on the foot; and that Dr. Schultz failed to refer him to a
specialist in a timely manner. The Alberts also alleged that Dr. Reddy had not
properly warned Mr. Alberts about the condition in his foot and that he failed to
perform the appropriate diagnostic tests and procedures on the foot in a timely
manner. Finally, the Alberts claimed that the thirteen-day delay in treatment
decreased the probability that Mr. Alberts' leg could be saved.
The trial court issued partial summary judgment in favor of the defendantdoctors, concluding that the Alberts had not established to a reasonable degree of
medical probability that the actions and/or inactions of Dr. Schultz or Dr. Reddy
caused Mr. Alberts' injury. 9 Nevertheless, the trial court found an issue of material
fact regarding whether the allegedly negligent conduct of either or both doctors
increased the risk that Mr. Alberts' leg had to be amputated. Seeking guidance from
the state's appellate courts in determining whether New Mexico recognizes a cause
of action for loss of chance, the trial court certified the following issues for
interlocutory appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals:'0
(1) whether New Mexico should recognize a patient's claim that, in the
treatment of a medical condition, a health giver's negligence has resulted in the
loss of a chance for a better result; and (2) if New Mexico does recognize loss
of chance, whether the Alberts could recover under such claim.
The court of appeals determined that the issue involved was of substantial public
interest and certified the questions to the New Mexico Supreme Court."

7. See Alberts, 126 N.M. at 808, 975 P.2d at 1280.
8. Both Dee Alberts and Mildred Alberts filed suit together as husband and wife, plaintiffs.
9. See id.; see also N.M. R. Cv. P. 1-056 (providing for summary judgment when there is no dispute as
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law).
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-4 (1991) allows a districtjudge to issue a written interlocutory order when the
judge believes the decision involves a "controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
differences of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order or decision would materially advance the

ultimate termination of the litigation .... "
11. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14(C)(2) (1996) grants the New Mexico Supreme Courtjurisdiction in matters
"appealed to the court of appeals, but undecided by that court, if the court of appeals certifies to the supreme court
that the matter involves ... an issue of substantial public interest that should be determined by the supreme court."
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The New Mexico Supreme Court answered the first certified question in the
affirmative, finding it appropriate for New Mexico to recognize the loss of chance
theory of recovery." In answering the second certified question, whether the Alberts
could recover for loss of chance, the court applied the doctrine to the facts of the
case and held that the Alberts' claim must fail.13 The court found that the Alberts
had not sufficiently established the causation element in their negligence claim.14
Specifically, the court found that the Alberts had not demonstrated, to a reasonable
degree of medical probability, that either doctor's negligence was the proximate
cause of Mr. Alberts' loss of the chance of saving his leg.15
Justice Maes, writing separately, favored the adoption of the loss of chance
doctrine but dissented with respect to summary judgment for the defendants.' 6
Justice Maes argued that the majority had weighed the evidence on appeal. 7 She
disagreed with the majority's statement that the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert
physician, Dr. Hutton, was based on mere speculation.' She noted that an expert's
opinion is admissible so long as the expert "gives a satisfactory explanation" as to
how he or she arrived at that opinion.'9 Applying that standard, Justice Maes found
that Dr. Hutton's opinion that the success rate of the bypass procedure would have
been greater than 90 percent was a reasonable inference that could be drawn from
the facts presented at trial.' Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, Justice Maes found that the expert's testimony created an
issue of material fact, requiring reversal of the summary judgment and remand to
the lower court for further proceedings."'
Ill. BACKGROUND
Before New Mexico state courts considered the loss of chance doctrine, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue inAlfonso v. LUnd.22 There, the
federal court rejected the plaintiff's plea of loss of chance, concluding that the
theory should not be addressed by the federal court without being first addressed by

12. See Alberts, 126 N.M. at 810, 975 P.2d at 1282.
13. See id at 815, 975 P.2d at 1287.
14. See i.

15. See id
16.

See id at 817-18,975 P.2d at 1289-90.

17. See id at 818, 975 P.2d at 1290.
18. See id at 817, 975 P.2d at 1289.
19. Id (citing Sanchez v. Molycorp, Inc., 103 N.M. 148, 152,703 P.2d 925,929 (Ct. App. 1985)).
20. See id
21. See id. at 818,975 P.2dat 1290.
22. 783 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 12, Alberts (No. 24,936). In
Alfonso, a seventeen-year-old male severed two fingers on his right hand with a power saw. At the hospital, the oncall surgeon, Dr. Lund, informed the boy's mother that he could not re-attach the fingers because too much time
had elapsed since the incident. Some time later, the family learned from another physician that the boy's fingers
could have been reattached. The Alfonsos brought suit against Dr. Lund, alleging that his negligence caused
permanent loss of the boy's fingers. The court issued a directed verdict because the plaintiff's expert testified that
he could only speculate as to whether the fingers could have been saved. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that they
were entitled to recover because any chance to save the boy's fingers had been lost. The court noted New Mexico
case law holding that establishing causation in medical malpractice cases required proof that the physician's

negligence probably caused the ultimate injury. The court also surveyed other jurisdictions, which where split on
the question of whether loss of chance was a viable theory of recovery.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 30

New Mexico state courts." At that time, the loss of chance doctrine was not widely
accepted among jurisdictions and states were still in disagreement as to its utility.'
New Mexico state courts did not address the theory until twelve years after its
25 the New
rejection in Alfonso. In Baer v. Regents of the University of California,
Mexico Court of Appeals directly examined and accepted the doctrine. By that time,
Professor Joseph H. King's article on the principles underlying the loss of chance
claim had been cited with approval in numerous jurisdictions and was influential
in the adoption of the loss of chance theory in many states.2 6 By the time of the Baer
decision, a majority of states had recognized the loss of chance theory in some form,
a recognition that was influential in the Baer court's decision to adopt the
doctrine.27

In Baer, Helmut Baer, an employee of Los Alamos National Laboratories
(LANL), underwent annual physical exams as required by his employer." In 1985
a chest x-ray revealed a lesion in his right lung. 29 One year later the lesion was reexamined and interpreted as benign. The LANL doctor recommended that Mr. Baer
submit to periodic exams and x-rays to monitor the lesion. In July 1989, Mr. Baer
was seen by a physician's assistant, not a doctor, and for the first time since the
discovery of the lesion on his lung in 1985, he did not receive a chest x-ray. In
1990, Mr. Baer was diagnosed with lung cancer by an independent physician, and,
despite undergoing subsequent medical treatment, died in October 1991.
Mrs. Baer brought a wrongful death action against the physician's assistant,
alleging that his failure to take an x-ray in 1989 was the proximate cause of Mr.
Baer's death. At trial, the plaintiff' s expert conceded that it would be "absolutely
pure speculation" to say whether Mr. Baer's cancer would have been detected in
1989 if an x-ray had been taken at the time. The trial court entered a directed verdict
for the defendant, finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the physiciai
assistant's failure to take an x-ray was the proximate cause of either Mr. Baer's
death or his loss of chance for survival. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that New
Mexico should adopt the loss of chance doctrine.
The Baercourt noted that New Mexico courts had "never directly addressed the
question of whether a person with a preexisting medical condition, whose chance
of recovery is reduced because of medical negligence, can recover for that lost
chance if the odds of recovery would have been less than fifty percent even with the
correct medical treatment."' The court explained that tort law traditionally
provided relief only for damages caused by a defendant's negligence when the
plaintiff had a better-than-even (greater than fifty percent) chance of recovery or

23. See Alfonso, 783 F.2d at 964.
24. See id.
25. 126 N.M. 508,972 P.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1998).
26. See idi at 511-12,972 P.2d at 12-13 (noting the influence of Joseph H. King, Causation, Valuation, and
Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L. 1353
(1981)).

27.
28.
otherwise
29.
30.

See idi at 512, 972 P.2dat 13.
AlU facts and proceedings are taken directly from Baer, 126 N.M. at 512, 972 P.2d at 13, unless
specified.
See id.
Id.
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survival, while denying recovery to those victims whose chances of survival were

not as favorable (less than fifty percent) before the negligent act.3" Nonetheless, the
Baer court determined that New Mexico should adopt the loss of chance doctrine.

In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the loss of chance doctrine is

consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323(a),32 which imposes
33

liability on those who fail to exercise reasonable care in performing services. In
addition, the court noted that the loss of chance doctrine is consistent with the
principle of apportioning damages based on causation as articulated in the proposed

Restatement (Third)of Torts section 50(b).'

The court also explained that the loss of chance theory is consistent with
principles of traditional New Mexico tort law in that New Mexico recognizes a

cause of action for enhancement or aggravation of a patient's preexisting

condition.35 The court further acknowledged that the theory is also consistent with
contemporary New Mexico tort law in which damages are apportioned in
36
accordance with the comparative fault of each individual tortfeasor. Moreover, the
Baer court emphasized that public policy in New Mexico, as articulated in past
decisions of the New Mexico Supreme Court, indicates that injured individuals

should be compensated for the wrongs committed against them,37 and that the

wrongdoer should be condemned for his actions. 3' Thus, the Baer court concluded
that compensating plaintiffs under the lost chance theory was completely consistent
39
with public policy in New Mexico, and adopted the loss of chance theory.
LI. RATIONALE
In February 1999, in Alberts v. Schultz,4' the New Mexico Supreme Court
formally adopted the loss of chance theory from the court of appeals' decision in
Baer. In Baer, the court of appeals treated the loss of chance injury as separate and

31. Seeid.at510-11,972P.2dat 11-12.
32. See id. at 512, 972 P.2d at 13.
33. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 323(a) (1965) states the following:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he
should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to
liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
perform his undertaking, if... his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm ....

34. See Baer, 126 N.M. at 512,972 P.2d at 13. The RESTATEMENTC (T1RD)oFTORTS § 50(b) (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1998), states that:
(b) Damages can be divided by causation when there is a reasonable basis for the factfinder to
determine: (1) that any legally culpable conduct of a party or other relevant person to whom the
factfinder assigns a percentage ofresponsibility was a legal cause of less than the entire damages
for which the plaintiff seeks recovery and (2) the amount of damages separately caused by that
conduct.
35. See Baer, 126 N.M. at 513,972 P.2d at 14 (citing Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Corp., 120 N.M.
422, 427, 902 P.2d 1025, 1030 (1995)).
36. See id. at 513-14, 972 P.2d at 14-15 (citing Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682,689,634 P.2d 1234, 1241
(1981)).
37. See id. at 514,972 P.2d at 15 (quoting Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621,624,798 P.2d
571,574 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 125 N.M. 721,965 P.2d 365 (1998)).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. 126 N.M. 807, 975 P.2d 1279(1999).
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distinct from the ultimate or resulting injury."' TheAlberts court agreed, stating that
the loss of chance injury can be described either as the exacerbation of the
presenting problem,42 or the destruction of the chance of survival.' 3 The court
explained that the "essence of the patient's claim is that, prior to the negligence [of
the health care provider], there was a chance that he or she would have been better
off with adequate care." Yet, because of the negligent act, the chance has been
either reduced or eliminated altogether."'
The Alberts court examined how other jurisdictions viewed the loss of chance
doctrine,' noting some resistance to the theory, partly because of its terminology."7
The court explained that some jurisdictions, concerned that the term "lost chance"
implies that the claim is for something indeterminate or intangible, have instead
labeled the claim "increased risk of harm." In some jurisdictions the claim is not
expressly recognized, but juries are permitted to evaluate a claim based on "proof
of a less-than-even chance of a cure."' 9 One jurisdiction requires that the loss of
chance claim be measured in terms of statistical probabilities." After consideration
of the various jurisdictional approaches to the loss of chance doctrine, the Alberts
court concluded that the Baer approach was appropriate and should be adopted. The
court then explained the parameters of the loss of chance injury and the elements
of the claim.
A.

The Elements of a Loss of Chance Claim

The court noted that most claims of this type begin with the patient entering the
health care setting with a presenting problem.5 That presenting problem can be a
disorder, an illness, fear, pain, discomfort or a combination of these.52 The problem
can also be either acute or chronic.53 Additionally, there must be a "negligent denial
by a healthcare provider of the most effective therapy for a patient's presenting
problem."' The negligence can be an incorrect diagnosis, the application of
inappropriate treatment, or a delay in providing the proper treatment.55 As a result,
the patient is deprived of the chance for recovery.56
The Alberts court outlined the basic test to be used in evaluating a loss of chance
claim. The court explained that the elements required for establishing a loss of
41. See Baer, 126 N.M. at 512,972 P.2d at 13.
42. See Alberts, 126 N.M. at 813, 975 P.2d at 1285.

43. See id.at 811, 975 P.2d at 1283.
44. Id
45. See id.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
Louisiana

See id.
See i.
See id.at 810,975 P.2d at 1282 (citing Gardner v. Pawliw, 696 A.2d 599,613 (N.J. 1997)).
See Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Dickerson, 356 S.E.2d 548, 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)).
See Alberts, 126 N.M. at 811, 975 P.2d at 1283. As examples, the court noted that Missouri and
have used statistics to analyze the loss of chance claims. See Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d

681,684 (Mo. 1992); Smith v. State Dep't of Health & Hosp., 676 So. 2d 543, 548 (La. 1996).
51. See Alberts, 126 N.M. at 810. 975 P.2d at 1281.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. lId
55. See id.

56. See iL
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chance claim vary from the elements in other medical malpractice actions only in
the nature of the injury for which relief is sought. 7 Specifically, the plaintiff must
58
establish the basic elements of duty, breach of duty, loss or damage, and causation.
59
The duty requirement is no different than that for a standard malpractice claim.
Health care providers owe a "duty to possess and apply the knowledge and to use
the skill and care ordinarily used by reasonably well-qualified health care providers
practicing under similar circumstances, giving due consideration to the locality
involved."6' The court cautioned that this duty does not have any guarantee of
beneficial results, infallible accuracy, the best use of modern technology or
unexcelled expertise.6 It is measured only in terms of the reasonableness of the
physician under the circumstances at the time.62
The second element of the loss of chance claim, breach of the established duty,
when the healthcare provider fails to act reasonably or departs from the
evident
is
recognized standards of medicine. 63 The Alberts court phrased this element as
"whether that duty was breached by the defendant's failure to timely or properly
diagnose the presenting problem and follow an appropriate course of treatment.""
As in other claims of negligence, after a duty has been established, the element of
breach is critical in determining whether the plaintiff's claim shall advance because
the essence of the assertion of wrongdoing is proof of the healthcare provider's
departure from the accepted standard of care.
The third element of the loss of chance claim is causation. 65 Any departure from
the standard of care must have been the cause or a contributing cause of the
plaintiff's injury.' Regarding proximate cause, the plaintiff is required to prove that
67
the defendant's negligence resulted in the lost chance for a better result. A
plaintiff "can be compensated if he can demonstrate, to a reasonable degree of
medical probability, a causal link between the doctor's negligence and the loss of
that chance." Causation, however, does not have to be proven by medical certainty
but by a reasonable medical probability.' The court sought to avoid any confusion
that may have been created by the Baer decision regarding the standard of proof to
be used for causation." In Baer, the court of appeals appeared to approve both the
medical certainty and the medical probability standards. 7 The Alberts court
clarified that the standard to be used in New Mexico will be"proof to a reasonable

57. See id. at 811,975 P.2d at 1283.
58. See id. at 812, 975 P.2d at 1284.
59. See id.
60. id (quoting N.M. UJ.I. CIv. 13-1101).
61.

See id

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

637 So.2d 1290, 1294 (La. Ct. App. 1994)).
See id. (quoting Snia v. United Med. Ctr.,
See id.
Id
See id. at 813-14, 975 P.2d at 1285-86.
See id at 814, 975 P.2d at 1286.

67. See id.

68. Id
69. See id. (quoting Hurley v. United States, 923 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1991)).
70. See id.

71. See id
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degree of medical probability."72 This standard requires that the negligence involved
is more likely than not to have caused the injury.73 The court reasoned that it is
appropriate in loss of chance cases to not require the plaintiff to prove the causal
link with absolute certainty because the physician's malpractice makes it impossible
to know how the patient would have turned out in the absence of the physician's
negligence.74
The final element of a loss of chance claim is the injury. It is the alleged injury,
loss, or damage that makes loss of chance claims different from other medical
malpractice claims.75 The injury is not the physical harm itself, but the lost chance
of avoiding the physical harm.76 The court compared the patient's chance for a
'
better result to "a window of time that existed before the malpractice took place."77
Yet, "[t]hrough negligent misdiagnosis, inappropriate therapy, or unnecessary
delays, the window of time was closed."78 Thus, the claim is not for the subsequent
injury, but for the lost chance of avoiding the injury or correcting the problem. 79
The court limited the injury to actual harm and warned against consideration of
any form of speculation or prognosis of future harm.' Accordingly, to determine
the actual injury caused by the negligence in loss of chance cases, courts must be
aware of "the underlying injury caused by the presenting problem and the
exacerbation of the presenting problem which evinces the chance that has been
lost."'" The court explained that "the deterioration of the presenting problem
is
's2
evidence that the chance of a better result has been diminished or lost.
The Alberts court explained the method of calculating damages in the loss of
chance claim, and adopting the approach taken in Baer, the court concluded that
damages would be awarded proportionally by the percentage value of the chance
for a better outcome. 3 Accordingly, damages are calculated using the difference
between the patient's chance of survival before and after the occurrence of the
negligence, as measured in terms of a percentage. The value of the chance of a
better result is apportioned as a percentage of the value of the life or limb of that
person in its entirety. 4 After giving examples of how courts should calculate these

72. Id.

73. See id.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See
See
See
See
Id.
See

id at 815, 975 P.2d at 1287.
id at 812, 975 P.2d at 1284.
id. at 813, 975 P.2d at 1285.
id.
id

80. See id
81. Id. at 813,975 P.2d at 1285 (citing Todd S. Aagaard, Note, Identifying and Valuing the Injury in Lost
Chance Cases, 96 MicH. L. REv. 1335, 1341 (1998)).
82. See id

83. See id. at 815, 975 P.2d at 1287.
84. See id.
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percentages, s" the court cautioned that the resulting numerical values obtained in
quantifying damages are not precise, but are only fair approximations based on
evidentiary proof' s
B. Application of Loss of Chance to the Alberts' Claim
Applying the loss of chance doctrine to the facts of the Alberts' claim, the court
concluded that the Alberts failed to establish the necessary causation element.8" The
court concluded that the Alberts neither demonstrated to a reasonable degree of
medical probability that the defendant doctors' actions caused the harm s ' nor
demonstrated the existence of a window of time during which measures could have
been implemented to eliminate the need to amputate Mr. Alberts' leg. 9 In addition,
the Alberts failed to show that Mr. Alberts was a suitable candidate for bypass
surgery at his initial visit with Dr. Reddy because their expert did not make any
authoritative conclusions about the integrity of the major arteries or veins in Mr.
Alberts' leg. 9 Lastly, the testimony of the expert failed to prove that absent any
negligence by either doctor, Mr. Alberts' had a chance to escape further
deterioration of the leg.9 ' For these reasons the court held that the Alberts failed to
prove their claim under the loss of chance theory.92
V. ANALYSIS
Analyzing the Alberts decision, several points are noteworthy. First, because
Alberts is an expansion of the Baerdecision, the reader should also understand the
reasoning of that decision. 3 Second, the adoption of the loss of chance doctrine
follows the direction of existing New Mexico law and places no new obligations on
defendants. Third, while the Alberts court suggested that providing a remedy for the
chance lost is not over-inclusive, the doctrine may be under-inclusive because of the
limitations inherent in the harm in-fact requirement. Under the harm-in-fact
standard a plaintiff may not bring a cause of action against a negligent defendant
until he can show evidence of physical progression of his condition.' Thus,
plaintiffs who have not suffered physical harm within three years of the act of
negligence may be left without a remedy.

85. As an example, the court explained that"the value of a patient's fifty-percent chance of survival is fifty

percent of the value of their total life. If medical malpractice reduced that chance of survival from fifty to twenty
percent, that patient's compensation would be equal to thirty percent of the value of their life." Id In another
example, the court noted that "the value of the a plaintiff's twenty-percent chance of saving a limb is twenty percent
of the value of the entire limb. If that plaintiff lost the entire twenty-percent chance of saving the limb, their
compensation would be twenty percent of the value of that limb." Id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id
89. See id.
90. See id. at 816, 975 P.2d at 1288.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See suprapart Il1
94. See id at 813, 975 P.2d at 1285.
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The Court's References to Baer

To fully understand the Alberts court's adoption of the loss of chance doctrine,
the reader must also reference Baer.95 While Alberts acknowledged Baer's role in
defining and explaining the doctrine, the Alberts court sought to clarify the doctrine
for the bench and bar." Specifically, the Alberts court recognized that Baer
provided historical background for the loss of chance doctrine and the reasons for
adopting the doctrine in New Mexico.' Building on this foundation, the Alberts
court sought to describe the parameters, elements and standards of proof of the
doctrine.9" The court's reliance on the Baer opinion," however, makes it difficult
for Alberts to stand alone as a complete declaration of the loss of chance doctrine
in New Mexico. Therefore, it is suggested that these cases be read concurrently.'t°
B. Adoption of Loss of Chance is Consistent With Existing New Mexico Tort
Law

Loss of chance is not a concept new to New Mexico law.' The principle
underlying the loss of chance doctrine is conceptually related to well-established
theories of recovery in New Mexico tort law."° For example, loss of chance is
substantially similar to the principles underlying enhancing or aggravating preexisting conditions, as recognized in Martinez v. FirstNationalBank."°3 Under both

theories the plaintiffs medical problem or condition is made worse by the
negligence of the defendant. Loss of chance is also similar to the comparative
negligence theory recognized in Scott v. Rizzo. 0 Under both theories the defendant
is liable for the percentage or portion of the damage he caused. Finally, loss of
chance is similar to a failure to diagnose cause of action, as recognized in Gonzales

95. See supra part IM.
96. See Alberts, 126 N.M. at 810,975 P.2d at 1282.
97. See id.; see also Baer v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 126 N.M. 508, 510-14, 972 P.2d 9, 11-15 (Ct.
App. 1998).
98. See Alberts, 126 N.M. at 810, 975 P.2d at 1282.
99. See references toBaerinAlberts,126 N.M. at 810-15, 975 P.2d at 1282-87.
100. See supra part III.
101. See Alberts, 126 N.M. at 811,975 P.2d at 1283; see also Plaintiffs-Appellants' Reply to DefendantsAppellees' Response to Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief in Chief at 2, Alberts (No. 18,193).
102. See id
103. 107 N.M. 268, 270, 755 P.2d 606, 608-09 (Ct. App. 1987). In that case the plaintiff presented to the
defendant-physician with a dislocated and fractured elbow. The defendant took an x-ray, attempted to reduce the
dislocation by 'popping' the elbow back into place, and preceded to place a cast on the plaintiff's arm. No x-rays
were taken prior to placing the cast on the elbow or 4-weeks later when the cast was removed. The plaintiff
continued to have pain and sought the opinion of another physician. It was determined by x-ray that the attempted
correction of the dislocated elbow failed, the elbow was fractured, and a muscle was torn in the arm. The expert
witness testified that because of the time delay in removing the bone fragments created by the defendant doctor,
the plaintiff suffered more extensive injury to his elbow, thus enhancing a pre-existing condition. The defendant
doctor's estate was held liable. See id. at 269, 755 P.2d at 607.
104. 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981). The Supreme Court of New Mexico abolished the doctrine of

contributory negligence, which allowed the plaintiff to bear the entire loss when the plaintiff's own acts contributed
(even if minutely) to the harm caused and allowed other wrongdoers to avoid liability. The court noted that justice
was not being achieved with this archaic rule and adopted comparative negligence as a more humane and more
equitable system of assigning liability in accordance with the respective fault. See id. at687,634 P.2d at 1239; see
also Appellant's Brief in Chief at 11, Alberts (No. 24,936).
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v. Sansoy, °5 where, because of the defendant's omission or delay in treatment the
plaintiff suffered damage which could have been avoided."6
The Doctrine Imposes No New Duties on Defendants
The loss of chance doctrine does not expand the scope of defendants' potential
liability.'07 A loss of chance claim cannot proceed without a showing of breach of
duty by the defendant. In any physician-patient relationship the physician has a duty
to "possess and apply the knowledge and to use the skill and care ordinarily used
by reasonable well-qualified [health-care providers] practicing under similar
circumstances.""'8 Only when the physician negligently fails to adhere to this duty
of care can the physician be held liable for damages caused to the plaintiff."°9 Thus,
the loss of chance doctrine does not expand the physician's duty in any way, nor
does it change the standard by which that duty is measured.
C.

The Loss of Chance Doctrine is Not Over-inclusive
The Alberts court stated that providing a remedy for the chance lost would not
be over-inclusive." ° Although the adoption of the loss of chance doctrine in New
Mexico has the potential to allow claims where the diminished chance may be of
negligible significance, the court did not see this as a valid reason to limit the
doctrine to instances in which the chance of recovery has been completely lost."'
Rather, the court suggested that in the future, courts might chose to limit recovery
to those cases where the loss of a chance is sizeable enough to be material, as
determined by the jury. 12 Additionally, the court reasoned that the cost of litigation
would discourage claims that are insignificant, ultimately eliminating any overinclusiveness of the loss of chance doctrine." 3
D.

The Loss of Chance DoctrineMay Be Under-inclusive
The Alberts court opined that recovery will not be allowed until the harm has
actually occurred." 4 The court emphasized that the injury "is not in any way
speculative... [it] does not involve prognostication about future injury or harm...
[and] is manifested by actual physical harm."" 5 This harm-in-fact requirement
E.

105. 102 N.M. 136,692 P.2d 522 (1984).
106. See id at 137,692 P.2d at 523.
107. See Alberts, 126 N.M. at 812. 975 P.2d at 1284; see also Plaintiff-Appellants' Reply to Defendants-

Appellees' Response to Plaintiffs- Appellants' Brief-in-Chief at 12, Alberts (No. 18,193).
108. Alberts, 126 N.M. at 812,975 P.2d at 1284 (quoting N.M. U.J.. CIV. 13-1101).
109. See id
110. See id. at 813, 975 P.2d at 1285.

111. See id
112. See id. at 813,975 P.2d at 1285 (citing Wollen v. DePaul Health Center, 828 S.W.2d 681,685 n.3 (Mo.
1992)).
113. See id (quoting James Lockhart, Annotation, Causeof Action for MedicalMalpracticeBased on Loss
of Chance of Cure, in 4 CAUSE OF ACTON 2D 1.45-46 (1994)).
114. Seeid. at 813,975 P.2d at 1285.
115.

id. at 813,975 P.2d at 1284.
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denies plaintiffs a remedy where the ultimate harm has not occurred within
6 the
Act."
Malpractice
Medical
the
by
imposed
three-year statute of limitations
7
For example, in Cummings v. X-Ray Associates," a woman underwent a preemployment physical in February 1986, which included x-ray procedures performed
by X-Ray Associates." 8 The x-ray showed a mass on her left lung but failed to
9
detect an additional mass on her right kidney." The mass on her left lung was later
t2
diagnosed as an arteriovenous malformation (AVM)" by a follow-up CT-scan in
June of 1986.121 Ms. Cummings had an additional chest x-ray by X-Ray Associates
in August of 1988 as part of her pre-op procedure before undergoing a
hysterectomy. 12 This x-ray also showed the mass on her left lung, but it was not
until February of 1990 that medical reports confirmed that the masses on her left
lung and right kidney were cancerous.' 2 3
Ms. Cummings filed suit against X-Ray Associates for failing to properly
diagnose the cancerous mass in her lung.' 2 She claimed that she was injured when
the cancer metastasized in 1992 and argued that her suit against X-Ray Associates
filed in December 1993 was within the three-year limitation period for medical
malpractice claims. 125 The court pointed out that Ms. Cummings could have brought
suit within the limitations period at any time after she learned that the masses on her
kidney and lungs were cancerous."n The court indicated a willingness to recognize
Ms. Cummings' increased risk as a cause of action, reasoning that "[i]t was
certainly possible for Cummings to have demonstrated some harm or increased risk,
even if metastasis could not be detected.' ' 127 The supreme court, however, held that
the limitations period began to run under the applicable statute in 1988, thus Ms.
suit was effectively barred by the New Mexico Medical Malpractice
Cummings
28
Act.
The supreme court appeared to be saying that Ms. Cummings could recover for

an increased risk of death from the cancer or for a lost chance of successful

treatment resulting from the negligent misdiagnosis, even though the cancer had not
yet metastasized. In contrast, the Alberts court evidently would not recognize a
claim for lost chance under the harm in-fact requirement until the plaintiff had
actually died or there was proof of metastasis of the cancer. Only then would the
9
plaintiff be able to show evidence of a loss or physical harm.
116. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-13 (1996). The New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act requires that a
medical malpractice action be brought within three years after the occurrence of the event that caused the injury.
See id.; see also Cummings v. X-Ray Assoc., 121 N.M. 821, 832-33, 918 P.2d 1321, 1332-33 (1996).
117. 121 N.M. 821,918 P.2d 1321 (1996).
118. See id. at 826,918 P.2d at 1326.
119. Seeid.
120. See id. AVM is defined as an abnormal shape or structure of arteries and veins. See TABER'S
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 143, 1075 (16th ed. 1989).
121. See Cummings, 121 N.M. at 826, 918 P.2d at 1326.
122. See id.
123. See i.
124. See id. at 825, 918 P.2d at 1325.
125. See id. at 827, 918 P.2d at 1237.
126. See id. at 836-37, 918 P.2d at 1336-37.
127. See id. at 837, 918 P.2d at 1337; see also, Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 11, Alberts (No. 18,193).
128. See Cummings, 121 N.M. at 837,918 P.2d at 1337.
129. See Alberts, 126 N.M. at 813, 975 P.2d at 1285.
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As in Cummings, although x-rays may reveal a lesion or mass on an exam, it
usually takes several years of follow-up x-rays to note any suspect changes in the
mass that warrant further testing and even longer before metastasis of the cancer is
detected. 3 Other life threatening and debilitating conditions may not manifest
injury or show exacerbation until years after initial discovery. For instance, HLV,
which ultimately leads to AIDS and death, can lie dormant in the human body for
more than five years after transmission.' 3' Therefore, a patient who may have been
negligently exposed to HIV by a medical professional may not be able to prove any
harm caused until after expiration of the three-year statute of limitation under New
Mexico's Medical Malpractice Act. The loss of chance claim could develop late,
effectively turning the suit into a survivor's claim and stripping the injured patient
of any benefit of a favorable judgment.'3 2
In sum, patients often have no way of knowing that they have been injured early
enough to comply with the harm in-fact standard of Alberts. The three-year statute
of limitations would effectively bar every suit. Therefore, the loss of chance
doctrine may fail to provide a remedy to those plaintiffs who suffer damages
stemming from diseases such as cancer and AIDS, which can go undetected for
several years. One solution to this problem would be a more relaxed standard of
proving the harm caused, such as a standard of increased risk of harm.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The adoption of the loss of chance doctrine has potential effects on plaintiffs,
defendants, and the judicial system. The process used to calculate damages in these
cases may cause problems for expert witnesses who attempt to value the lost chance
numerically. In many instances, one group's response to the doctrine could have a
snowball effect and ultimately impact another group, including non-legal groups
such as insurance companies.
A.

Plaintiffs' Responses to the Adoption of the Loss of Chance Doctrine
Patients with less compelling claims may seek recovery when they would not
have before the adoption of the doctrine.' 33 More patients may seek recovery merely
because they received undesirable results or ineffective treatment."M For example,
if a person with uncontrolled diabetes requires amputation of a foot due to
arteriosclerosis, 35 that person could sue the physician for medical malpractice,
alleging that the doctor's treatment was ineffective and resulted in the loss chance
of saving the foot. The potential increase in the number of claims could contribute
to an explosion of medical malpractice litigation and result in an excess burden on

130. See id. at 832, 918 P.2d at 1332.
131. See definition of AIDS, TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 53 (16th ed. 1989).
132. See J. Stephen Phillips, The "Lost Chance" Theory of Recovery, 27 COLO. LAW. 85, 86-87 (1998).
133. See Michelle L. Truckor, The Loss of Chance Doctrine:Legal Recovery for Patientson the Edge of
Survival, 24 U. DAYTON L REv. 349, 363 (1999).
134. See id. at 363-64.
135. Arteriosclerosis is the thickening and hardening of the arteries which leads to altered function in tissues
and organs. Untreated and uncontrolled diabetes is a risk factor of arteriosclerosis. See TABERS CYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 142 (16th ed. 1989).
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court dockets.' The Alberts court rejected this argument, suggesting that any flurry
of suits would be short lived because of the cost of litigation. 3
B.

Defendants' Responses to the Adoption of the Loss of Chance Doctrine

The adoption of the loss of chance doctrine could affect patient care through
physician responses. 'Reacting to a potential increase in loss of chance claims,
physicians may be more cautious in their treatment of patients and may begin to
practice defensive medicine for fear of liability. 38 Physicians could begin to order
unnecessary tests and procedures and require more hospital admissions and longer
hospital stays in order to avoid liability. 139 Alternatively, some physicians may be
less willing to treat patients who are seriously ill or dying. They may also try to
avoid procedures that are risky for fear of a bad outcome. The physician may
change the nature and extent of his practice in order to avoid liability in cases in
which a patient's survival is unlikely. 'I In addition, this increased fear of liability
could cause insurance companies to increase their malpractice insurance rates.
Unfortunately, it is more likely than not that the increased insurance rates would be
passed on to the consumer in the form of increased costs of health care services.
On the other hand, the loss of chance doctrine could encourage a different
response from physicians. The doctrine could serve as a deterrent to negligence in
the treatment of patients whose prospects for recovery are poor. Physicians may be
more likely to adhere to the ethical and professional duties owed to patients. "' They
may listen more attentively to patients' complaints or requests, which in turn could
lead to a reduction of medical malpractice claims. 42
C. The Impact of the Loss of Chance Doctrineon Managed Care
Organizations

The loss of chance doctrine may lead managed care and health maintenance
organizations to provide additional patient treatment rather than risk the possibility
136. See Truckor, supra note 133, at 363.
137. See Alberts v. Schultz, 126 N.M. 807, 813, 975 P.2d 1279, 1285 (1999).
138. See David Klingman et al., Measuring Defensive Medicine Using Clinical Scenario Surveys, 21 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y &L 185,189 (1996). Physicians practice positive defensive medicine when they order tests,
procedures, or visits, primarily (but not necessarily solely) to reduce their exposure to malpractice liability; and in
the alternative, physicians practice negative defensive medicine when they avoid certain patients or procedures in
order to reduce their exposure to malpractice liability. Id.
139. See iUsa Perrochet et al., Lost Chance Recovery and the Folly of Expanding Medical Malpractice
Liability,27 TORT & INS. LJ.615, 621 (1992).
140. See Truckor, supra note 133, at 369.
Teaching Professionalismin UndergraduateMedical Education, 282 JAMA
141. See Herbert Swick et al.,
830 (1999). Swick and his colleagues conducted a survey which showed that many medical schools recognize the
need to address professionalism when educating medical students. This survey looked at four attributes of
professionalism, "(1) subordinating one's self-interest to the interest of patients; (2) adhering to high ethical and
moral standards; (3) responding to societal needs, and (4)evincing core humanistic values (e.g. empathy, integrity,
altruism, trustworthiness)." Id at 831.

142. See Ezekiel J.Emanuel & Nancy N.Dubler, Preservingthe Physician-PatientRelationshipin the Era
ofManaged Care, 273 JAMA 323, 324 (1995) (explaining that good communication between the doctor and
patient can mitigate the occurrence of negative events that lead to medical malpractice litigation); see also iUsa
Cooper-Patrick et al.,
Race, Gender, and Partnership in the Patient-Physician Relationship, 282 JAMA 583, 589
(1999) ("Improving cross-cultural communication in health care settings may lead to more patient involvement in
care, adherence to recommended treatment, higher quality of care, and better health outcomes.").
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of liability under a loss of chance claim. In an effort to reduce the costs of health
care, managed care plans use a variety of cost-saving techniques."" Some
techniques are directed at the behavior of subscribers. These techniques restrict
subscribers to a particular group of physicians who have agreed to, or have a history
of, practicing medicine at lower costs, and deny subscribers access to a specialist
until they obtain the approval of the primary care physician." Managed care plans
also restrict physicians' ability to order tests and perform procedures that the plan
has determined to be unnecessarily costly or medically inappropriate. 45 As a result,
both the doctor-patient relationship and quality of care received by the patient may
be compromised." After Alberts, managed care and health maintenance
organizations in New Mexico are no longer able to look solely at how much money
is being saved in the under-treatment of patients. These organizations may see a
greater necessity to balance more equitably the health care needs of the patient
against cost-cutting measures that may be inconsistent with quality care.
D.

The Uncertaintyof Damage Calculationin Loss of Chance Cases
The damage calculation standard in Alberts assumes that medicine is more of a
science than an art, that all patients follow a precise, predetermined pathway in the
manifestation of an illness or condition and that physicians can predict a patient's
outcome or response to particular medical procedures or treatments based on
"medical cookbooks" providing these answers. 4 7 The use of the Alberts' damage
calculation standard may result in increased pressure on physicians testifying as
medical witnesses to provide precise numbers representing the patient's chance lost,
even without a scientific way to prove the accuracy of their answers.' Formulation
of a number describing the percentage of a chance lost cannot be very precise. No
one can honestly and accurately give an exact number; they can only guess or
estimate. 4 9 Physicians don't have "crystal balls" that will give them exact answers
to these problems."5 They derive their answers from a combination of intuition,
experience, and education.' The Alberts court acknowledged that the valuation of
life and limb is imprecise. 1 2 How can we expect physicians to come up with exact
numbers? When they do, will their answers be taken at face value or will they be
subjected to scrutiny? A court's heavy reliance on precise numbers poses the threat
of a Daubert-likechallenge anytime a physician testifies on the issue of damages.'

143. See AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330
(1995).
144. See id.

145. See id.
146. See id. at 331 (citing the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as expressing its concerns

about allegations received of eight instances of insufficient patient care practices by HMO's); see also, David
Blumenthal, Health Care Reform at the Close of the 20th Century, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1916, 1918 (1999).
147.

Pia Salazar, Address at the Tort Update Seminar (Albuquerque, NM, April 30, 1999).

148. See id.
149. See id.
150.

See id.

151. See id.
152. See Alberts, 126 N.M. at 815, 975 P.2d at 1287.
153. See Daubert v. Merreil Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert,the Supreme Court held
that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs expert testimony and superseded the Frye "generally accepted" test.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The adoption of the loss of chance doctrine can be read as a response by the New
Mexico courts to public policy demands for the fair apportionment of damages. The
Alberts opinion offers plaintiffs with a less than fifty percent chance of survival a
cause of action previously unavailable to them. Unfortunately, because of the harm
in-fact requirements of proving the loss of chance injury, this new doctrine may not
offer a remedy to some plaintiffs with valid injuries.
Nevertheless, the loss of chance doctrine helps to redistribute the injured party's
economic burden and serves to deter negligent conduct by health care practitioners
toward patients with preexisting conditions or those patients whose prospects for
recovery are poor. As such, the New Mexico Supreme Court's adoption of the loss
of chance doctrine is consistent with existing tort law and public policy in New
Mexico.
BEVERLY P. SPEARMAN

The Daubert test requires that an expert's testimony regarding scientific evidence be supported by the methods and
procedures of science. The scientific theory or technique offered must be 1)tested or capable of being tested, 2)
subjected to peer review and publication, 3) provide a known or potential rate of error, and 4) have some aspects
of general acceptance. See id. at 593-94.

